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	Introduction 
RY: You have consistently discussed structural 
inequality in your public talks. Could you tell me 
what kind of theoretical questions related to 
economic justice were taken up as a result of 
Indian academics’ involvement in the women’s 
movements in the 1970s and the 1980s? 
 
UC: If we go back to the pre-neoliberal phase in 
India, the women’s movement was addressing 
structural inequality of the old, congealed kind, 
which had not been engaged with till then. When 
the women’s movement began in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, a lot of movements were growing 
across the country. Actually movements had been 
growing since the Naxalite one in 19671 and 
women had been quite involved in that. Again, 
post-Emergency2, there were lots of movements 
in which women were quite active. For instance, 
there was the peasant women’s movement in 
Shahada in Maharashtra which had been quite 
strong. These were movements which were 
addressing questions of structural inequality and 
questions pertaining to the most marginalised 
women, like Adivasi women. So questions of 																																																													
1 The Naxalite movement was originally intended as an 
‘armed struggle’ aimed at ‘redistribution’ of land and 
had begun in the village of Naxalbari in the state of 
West Bengal in India. It has had a long and complicated 
history and continues to impact parts of the country. 
Following links offer an understanding of the past and 
present of the movement:   
https://www.mapsofindia.com/my-
india/government/naxalite-movement-in-india 
 https://www.dailyo.in/politics/naxalite-naxalbari-may-
25-1967-charu-mazumdar-kanu-
sanyal/story/1/17404.html 
https://scroll.in/article/838441/the-naxal-movement-
burst-to-life-50-years-ago-on-this-day-a-revolutionary-
remembers-may-24-1967 
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-
states/naxalbari-the-bengal-village-where-50-years-of-
a-movement-is-celebrated/article18447130.ece 
https://www.epw.in/maoist-movement-india 
(All links accessed: 4 Sep 2018. 20: 07.)  
2 ‘Emergency’ is the state of President’s Rule under the 
Indian constitution; it allows the President to freeze the 
fundamental rights of Indian citizens alleging internal 
threats to India’s security. In June 1975 the then Prime 
Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, had declared 
Emergency in the country, which lasted till March 1977.  
inequality had always been very important for 
various women’s movements; and, at least, it was 
informed by the fact that there were many layers 
of inequality in our society. It was not simply a 
case of our issues… 
 
RY: Who do you mean by ‘our’? 
 
UC: Metropolitan women in this case. For 
example, Mathura’s rape, which was custodial 
rape in a police station, represented the power of 
the state against the very disempowered women 
(Mathura was an Adivasi woman). It was not an 
accident that it was Mathura who was raped.3 Or 
Ramiza Bi. People from the margins get raped in 
the thana (police station); metropolitan women 
might get raped elsewhere but not in a thana. 
Now Mathura’s case was taken up by a women’s 
group in Nagpur which was led by Seema Sakhare. 
This was unlike the dowry movement which was a 
metropolitan women’s movement, and had 
emerged in Delhi and other urban areas. Similarly, 
the point of emergence for the LGBT movement 
was the metropolis, though, today, the issues and 
members come from across the board. 
 
This understanding of differences among women 
and women being oppressed in multiple ways – 
class, caste or something else – was there in the 
women’s movement; but there was more 
sensitivity to questions of class and work on caste 
and its relationship with class had not been done. 
 
RY: This work had not been done till the late 
1970s? 
 
UC: See there had been a number of women in 
the Naxalite movement. So when the Emergency 
was lifted in 1977 and the Naxalite movement 
began to resurface a lot of the women from that 
movement were involved in the new, smaller 
women’s movements which were very strongly 
focused on addressing inequalities inherited from 
the past. This past was not only the colonial one, 																																																													
3 The rape of an Adivasi (tribal) woman, Mathura, in 
police custody in rural Uttar Pradesh in 1978 and the 
subsequent acquittal of her rapists led to protests by 
women’s groups in India. These protests and an open 
letter by lawyer and scholar, Upendra Baxi, to three 
Supreme Court judges eventually also resulted in 
changes to rules regarding evidence in the prosecution 
of rape cases in Indian courts. 
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but also the pre-colonial one. We were all very 
familiar with traditional inequalities because of 
films and so on. The question of dowry violence 
which was a little bit more middle class and urban, 
only came second. 
 
RY: So, for example, in urban Madhya Pradesh – 
which is where I come from – dowry is a 
contemporary problem across boundaries of 
religion and caste. Was it like that? 
 
UC: When it first surfaced as an issue, it was a 
problem of the lower middle and upper classes. It 
was an urban issue and it was not a Dalit issue. 
But if you look at pamphlets that were produced 
during the Mathura campaign, the pamphlets 
actually talked about sexual violence against 
particular sections, and basically, those at the 
margins of society. There was that dimension to 
the women’s movement which did not get picked 
up somehow. 
 
RY: You mean it did not get picked up politically? 
Or do you mean theoretically? 
 
UC: Well, in later writing. Somehow the questions 
around dowry violence led to other kinds of 
discussions and debates. There were groups of 
people who got together post the intervention in 
dowry violence and brought in [the issue of] 
domestic violence as it operated within marriage. 
That created space to talk about what was 
happening inside homes, behind closed doors. 
Lots of women would come and talk about the 
fact that they were being beaten up. This 
discussion of patriarchy as a violent expression of 
masculine power emerged as a powerful 
dimension of discussions in those groups. Thus, 
we could see a connection between violence in 
the lower middle class against the wife, or the 
daughter-in-law, over dowry, and domestic 
violence which was not around dowry but around 
patriarchal power. 
 
RY: And was this then connected up with other 
forms of violence like what happened to Mathura 
and with other structural inequalities? 
 
UC: It was moving [in that direction]. Structural 
inequality was seen as something that was in the 
public sphere whereas dowry-related and other 
domestic violence were happening in the 
domestic sphere. It is like this: even the better off 
women do not have access to resources. Early 
academic work that Bina Agarwal4 did helps 
identify this. This lack of access to resources was 
actually brought up in the Bodhgaya movement 
too but in a different context. The women 
agricultural labourers in Bodhgaya (Bihar) argued 
that all their labour was consumed by the head of 
the household who seemed to think that the 
women did nothing. Agricultural labourers had 
been about to get land in their own names5 and 
these women demanded that women agricultural 
labourers should get it individually in their names. 
There was also a focus on inequality between 
classes and castes – because the Bodhgaya 
women were predominantly Dalits. Actually this 
was an interesting moment because these women 
were looking at structural inequality as well as 
inequality in the home in economic terms. 
 
There was this famous poster which read, ‘Meri 
biwi kaam nahi karti’ (my wife does not work). It is 
an inversion of Chandralekha’s multi-armed 
goddess – Chandralekha was a version of ‘Kali’.6 
The poster turned this image around to discuss 
the domesticated woman at a workshop. There 
were actually ten arms attached to the body in the 
image to represent all the work that women do at 
home. The poster showed the woman cooking, 
bringing firewood, etcetera and where the uterus 
is, the poster had this text: ‘bacche paida karna 
bhi kaam hai’ (bearing children is also work). Thus 
all aspects of domestic labour were presented. I 																																																													
4 See Agarwal 1994. 
5 The Bodhgaya Math, a ‘Shaivite monastic institution’, 
had grown and occupied several thousand acres of land 
around the Math during Mughal and British rule (Geary 
2013, Alaka and Chetna 1987). While some of the land 
was distributed post-independence substantial 
portions continued to be under the Math’s control till 
the 1970s. During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, 
agricultural labourers, under the leadership of the 
Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini, struggled successfully 
to get this land back. For further details, see Chhachhi 
and Pittin 2014. 
Also see:  
https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/indiascope/story
/19801215-labourers-demand-share-to-the-crops-
grown-on-landed-property-held-by-bodhgaya-mahant-
773639-2013-11-30 
(Last accessed: 24 Oct 2018, 10:00) 
6 Kali is a militant, dark, Indic mother goddess. 
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am struck by how rich the conceptualisation was 
and how much it owed itself to the interaction 
between middle class women and women who 
laboured outside the home in a variety of 
capacities. So you were also getting these 
accounts of women from the (socioeconomically) 
lowest sections.  
 
The way I see it is that Bina Agarwal’s demand 
that women should have access to resources was 
one side of it and the Bodhgaya movement was 
the other side of it. The women’s movement was 
actually able to bring the two together in a very 
interesting move. That’s why I feel that the 
Bodhgaya movement should actually be better 
disseminated. It was concerned with the rights of 
agricultural labourers whereas Bina Agarwal’s 
scholarship was concerned with a larger range of 
social groups who had access to resources like 
land.  
 
Bodhgaya was a movement of Dalit labourers, so 
it did not get the kind of attention and prestige 
that some other movements did. For example, the 
Chipko movement7 was seen as a non-class 
movement where the struggle was over what 
were seen as community resources; it did not 
entail class wars and redistribution. Women were 
seen as nurturing the environment and it was 
understood that it was their lives that were 
affected by state policy regarding forests; they 
had to go into the forest for fuel, etc. and so the 
burden of their labour went up if forests were 
destroyed. Chipko was a Gandhian movement as 
opposed to a militant one. And it was not 
challenging patriarchy; it was the ‘outsider’ that 
was the problem here, not the power that men 
exercised over women within the family. Similarly, 
the anti-arrack movement8 actually took on men 																																																													
7 This was a movement led by women to prevent 
deforestation in parts of what is now the state of 
Uttarakhand (it was part of the state of Uttar Pradesh 
in the 1970s when the movement took place). For 
more details, see, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chipko-movement 
and https://indianexpress.com/article/what-is/what-is-
the-chipko-movement-google-doodle-5111644/ 
(Accessed on: 4 Sep 2018, 19: 58.) 
8 Arrack is a local variety of liquor in the Indian state of 
Andhra Pradesh. The anti-arrack movement refers to 
the movement led by women’s groups against the sale 
who were ‘outsiders’; though a fundamental 
reason women had begun to oppose liqueur sale 
had been that alcoholism caused husbands to be 
even more violent. So since the Bodhgaya 
movement was a movement of Dalit women, was 
more militant and had more explicitly challenged 
patriarchy, it was not documented and circulated 
as much as it deserved to be. 
 
This was a problem with India’s women’s 
movement: the divide between metropolitan 
women and rural women. For example, women’s 
movements in Bihar did engage with the 
Bodhgaya movement but the metropolitan 
women’s movement do/did not teach it or talk 
about it. I am being harsh but with good reason. 
The latter’s understanding of class, caste, etc. is 
somewhat simplistic. Of course, some women in 
this group have a sharper understanding but the 
majority does not. Neither the media nor the 
historians of women’s movements have picked up 
on it. The (dominant) histories tend to focus on 
just Delhi and Mumbai, for example, Raka Ray’s 
book also does that. The anti-arrack movement 
was far more successful and yet, fails to get the 
academic and media attention it deserves. 
Similarly, in Hyderabad a large number of women 
struggled for land distribution in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s; I have found women who have 
been jailed several times as a result of their 
participation in such autonomous women’s 
movements. In the case of the Bodhgaya 
movement, the theorising came from a student 
and youth movement called, the Chhatra Yuva 
Sangharsh Vahini in Bihar; women like Kiran 
Shaheen and Manimala who were part of the old 
JP (Jay Prakash Narayan) movement, theorised 
what happened in Bodhgaya. 
 
RY: So where did all this lead to, in terms of 
theorisation of the question of economic justice for 
women? 																																																																																																
and consumption of arrack and other liquor; it had 
arisen in the context of the Total Literacy Mission 
launched by the government of India. For further 
details, see Saxena 2002 and Pappu 2002. 
Also see: http://www.anveshi.org.in/broadsheet-on-
contemporary-politics/broadsheet-on-contemporary-
politics-vol-2-no-1011/anti-arrack-movement-
prohibition-and-after-eenadus-strategic-support-and-
silence/ (Last accessed on 4 Sep 2018, 20: 16). 
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UC: It was a simple account of women’s labour 
being appropriated by others. It was feminist 
economics which may have resonances with ways 
of thinking in other parts of the world. But the 
way the Bodhgaya movement created political 
practice out of it, was far ahead of feminist 
theorising. Though Bina Agarwal did important 
work she did not discuss patriarchy and access to 
resources in precisely this way. The women in the 
Bodhgaya movement understood domestic 
violence and had already factored it in. They 
asked, ‘when my husband has nothing he has so 
much power over me, when he gets the land how 
much more power will he get over me?’ 
 
RY: If we forget about disciplinary boundaries 
what kind of theoretical engagement have you 
seen with questions of economic justice in the last 
forty years? 
 
UC: There have been many struggles around the 
question of control over various means of 
production, for example, the fish workers’ 
movement. Women have been at the forefront of 
those struggles some of which have been 
theorised as well. For instance, Ilina Sen’s edited 
collection, A space within the struggle, is a 
marvellous account of what different locations 
produce in the way of economic and political 
struggles and also how different groups of women 
understand power. However, I do not think we 
have adequately systematised the theory that 
people’s movements have been able to generate 
from practice. That is one of the quarrels that I 
have with the way the women’s movement has 
gone.  
 
RY: So, if there have always been multiple 
movements why are we calling it ‘the’ women’s 
movement? 
 
UC: ‘The women’s movement’ is the name given 
to the larger set of autonomous women’s 
movements in the country and which largely 
followed the Mathura movement. In dominant 
narratives in the public sphere and in most of 
academic and popular writing and university 
curricula, however, the understanding of this 
movement remains limited to struggles and issues 
of metropolitan women. It is not understood in its 
totality. Rural women, for example, fought in 
different ways and had different concerns. A 
wonderful example of this was the way rural 
women working as Sathins in Rajasthan (between 
1986 and 1992-1993) developed a critique of the 
state and its family planning programme.9 Of 
course, some feminist academics’ politics 
emerged from their participation in the women’s 
movement and their critical grasp of a range of 
issues and recognition of a range of women’s 
groups is reflected in their own writing and 
teaching. For example, Nandini Manjrekar, Sadhna 
Saxena are such academics. 
 
However, more generally, our understanding is 
limited to metropolitan women’s struggles and 
any movements that do not fit into this 
understanding are ignored. We have failed to 
attend to the fact that activism on the ground is 
much richer than our theorisation so far. For 
example, there is Sundari:10 she is extraordinary! 
She is a fisherwoman and an activist in the 
Kudankulam anti-nuclear movement. If we do not 
engage with this movement how will we know 
what, or how, Sundari thinks? Of course, she is 
not waiting for us to understand and write about 
her. She has written her own book in Tamil (The 
Fiery Struggle of Idinthakarai). 
 
RY: This academic work was done after the late 
1980s? 
 
UC: Definitely. Much later. By the time we began 																																																													
9 A sathin is the elected representative of women in 
every Panchayat of the state of Rajasthan in India and 
is elected by the women’s Gram Sabha (village 
committee). The sathins were engaged in a radical 
sathin programme during mid-1980s and early 1990s; 
they also attended the Calicut Conference (mentioned 
elsewhere in this interview) and were the life of that 
conference. Eventually their programme was 
transformed into a regular government programme 
that lost its critical edge. 
10 For more on the movement and Sundari, please see, 
https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-intrepid-
women-vs-goliath-2237083 (Accessed: 15 Feb 2019) 
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-
india/kudankulam-nuclear-plant-protest-sedition-
supreme-court-of-india-section-124a-3024655/. 
(Accessed: 27 Aug 2018) 
Also see: https://www.firstpost.com/india/dissent-
diary-the-women-protesting-the-kudankulam-power-
plant-are-chronicled-in-a-new-book-2695570.html. 
(Accessed: 27 Aug 2018) 
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to produce academic work, it was the late 1980s, 
event mid-1990s. I see Sangari and Vaid’s 
‘Recasting Women’ — it came out in 1989 — as 
the major moment of thinking about structures in 
a historical context. The introduction to that book 
is marvellous. And then other scholarship started 
coming afterwards. 
 
RY: So clearly feminist theorising was being led by 
the women’s movement. 
 
UC: There was no question that it wasn’t being led 
by the women’s movement! We did not see 
ourselves as academics. We had one foot in 
academia and the other in activism. I was pushed 
to look at history from a feminist angle. I was told: 
“please go back and don’t come to any more of 
these demonstrations. Take leave and go back and 
tell us what is there in our culture that says that 
when a woman gets married she goes out and 
even her (dead) body should not come back.” 
Because I was an historian of early Indian history. 
 
RY: Who did this demand come from? From the 
women who were protesting? 
 
UC: The women who were protesting: they were 
so furious! Women had no escape from marriage. 
Nobody cared what happened to them after 
marriage. In my first feminist piece I wrote about 
‘Sita’. It had come out of the question of the right 
to live, and to live with dignity. Women saw that 
as something that was missing in our culture. This 
kind of questioning shows how feminist theorising 
was led by women’s activism. 
 
RY: But more needs to be done in terms of 
theoretical engagement? 
 
UC: Oh, a lot more! That generation of women 
activist-academics did a lot of such work. For 
example, there is Radha Kumar’s book on factory 
workers; there was a lot of work on factory 
workers. 
 
RY: But after that? It has been one more 
generation? 
 
UC: That is true. It’s a lack. Let me put it this way: 
for example, if feminist academics want to 
understand what is happening with unorganised 
labourers they will go and look at SHGs (self-help 
groups) rather than [at] the actual conditions of 
women workers and how they struggle or survive. 
To some extent, it is also the imperative of 
critiquing neoliberalism that drives you to look at 
SHGs but the fact is that they need to question the 
production system. The kind of work that Maria 
Mies11 did, where she looks at the women lace-
makers of Narsapur, has disappeared. For 
example, in India we have women working from 
home in multiple industries today and for a while, 
some feminist scholars did focus on the nature of 
this new production system and the kind of self-
exploitation that happens in this context. They 
looked at who got the money and so on. Till I was 
teaching in Wardha, that generation of students 
was still looking at these questions. 
 
RY: When was this? 
 
UC: Up till 2006. My students were looking at 
glassmakers and so on. This kind of work has gone 
out completely in “First world” universities. 
Because we are all doing intersectionality, 
intersectionality, intersectionality. In theory. We 
are not doing it in practice! That is, we don’t use it 
in the way we write about the women’s 
movement [in India]; we have begun to use the 
categories “dalit” or “gay” and the term, 
“multiplicity” in a routine way; but these have not 
helped evolve the way we think of inequality. 
 
We have dropped the economic questions. We 
are aware of the fact of structural adjustment and 
that neoliberalism has been a new onslaught upon 
us (the “third world”). Some work was being done 
on the new kinds of exploitation but even that has 
stopped. For example, I am not seeing much work 
on feminisation of poverty any more. What is 
being engaged, to some extent, is the attack on 
the Adivasi lands, and the protest movements in 
Chhattisgrah. These are not (just) radical Left 
movements; in fact, the bulk of these are not 
[associated with] Left movements, for example, 
Soni Sori’s struggle is not. 
 
RY: Even this work is not very substantial, the 
focus is not systematic. 
 
UC: No, it isn’t. We have allowed economic 
questions to drop. Somewhere along the line, 
questions of identity have come to dominate 
outside of questions of poverty and inequality. But 
there are also a number of scholars who have 
sustained their focus [on economic questions]. 																																																													
11 See Mies 2014. 
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And these scholars wrote about the smaller 
struggles of people who would not otherwise have 
been looked at. So it is important that Nalini 
Nayak and others have written these accounts of 
fish workers’ struggles or women’s participation in 
Kudankulam. Kudankulam is not an economic 
question, it’s a huge political question. 
 
RY: You said12 that people claim there is no 
women’s movement any longer. But that’s not 
really true. There is a multiplicity of movements, 
isn’t there? 
 
UC: Absolutely. It’s gone to different places. 
 
RY: So, both, women’s role in movements and the 
status of the question of women’s rights, are 
different now? 
 
UC: Yes. The earlier women’s movement has gone 
to different places. Gone into different locations 
and the media is not interested in that. For 
instance, when in 2016 we marked thirty years of 
‘Saheli’13, which is an autonomous women’s group 
in Delhi, there was a big event. They are invested 
in the political and economic aspects of the 
question of gender and had assembled a very 
interesting collection of people from Kashmir and 
many other places. For example, they had 
Sundari. Her formulation of the issues is based on 
her experiences. Apparently, she was not 
bothered about Kudankulam till she saw 
Fukushima on TV; and then she said to herself, 
‘hey, this can happen to us! It happened there and 
they have so many cars and so many means of 
escape. We don’t have a single car in this village! 
Where will we go? How will we get out of here?’ 
And she is now a full time member of the 
movement against the Kudankulam nuclear plant. 
Yet, what is striking is that no media persons came 
to do interviews with her when she was at the 
event. 
 
RY: Maybe not “national” media but perhaps local 
media had come? 
 
UC: But my question is why not Delhi-based media 
outlets? Media is only interested in the gender 
question in a limited sense. Not in the [entire] 
range of things I am talking about. 																																																													
12 This is a reference to the talk Uma Chakravarti gave 
at the University of Warwick in June 2017. 
13 ‘Saheli’ is the Hindi word for a girl or woman friend. 
 
RY: They are only interested in the ‘pink-ribbon’14 
version of gender issues! 
 
UC: Yes, it has been totally domesticated, or 
sanitized in some ways. Media was never 
interested. Why else would we not know about 
Bodhgaya? 
 
RY: So these smaller struggles are not visible 
precisely because these are about structural 
inequality and women’s economic rights and the 
media is not interested in these questions. 
 
UC: See, the media is the least idealistic segment 
of our society at the moment. Media has dropped 
poverty. Media has dropped inequality. They only 
show what the middle and upper-middle classes 
want to see, that is, stories of their own upward 
mobility. These sections do not actually care 
about all the other people left down below. If you 
are hungry or something they don’t want to hear 
that story. Look at the way the Tamil Nadu 
farmers had to struggle [in 2016] … 
 
RY: …they came up with all sorts of innovative 
ways to make themselves visible and were still 
unable to get a response out of the government. 
 
UC: So who is genuinely interested in questions of 
land, or, questions of Adivasi groups? Sometimes 
the media can get an iconic figure and they will 
pick her up and write about her. But they are not 
interested in the questions of survival that face 
the large mass of our people. ‘Do they go to bed 
hungry?’ ‘Not interested.’ 
 
RY: In one of your talks you have spoken about 
new media and alternate media. Can you trace 
that history a little bit? How did it begin to have an 
impact on public discourses? 
 
UC: In the early stages when the women’s 
movement started off, the immediate response of 
young documentary filmmakers was quite 
significant. 
 																																																													
14 The reference is to the ‘Race for Cancer’ campaign 
for raising awareness of breast cancer in the USA. 
Klawiter (1999: 110) notes that different kinds of 
campaigns (‘walk’, ‘race’ and ‘tour’) corresponded to 
different kinds of women and cultural politics. She 
argues that the ‘Race for Cancer’ and the pink ribbon 
that symbolises it, represented ‘white, heterosexual, 
middle-class, consumerized femininity.’ 
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RY: Is this the 1970s that you are talking about? 
 
UC: No. It is the 1980s… it was probably even early 
1990s by the time they started making films. The 
first film that came out was on dowry violence. 
Meera Dewan had made it. It is not a well-made 
film; actually there are ethical questions because 
it involved a woman making some sort of a dying 
declaration on camera. It is under twenty minutes 
and I showed it in my classes at Miranda House15. I 
would particularly bring up films that our own ex-
students had made and Meera Dewan had been 
our student. Then there is a wonderful film made 
by two women on the Calicut Conference in 1994, 
of which, only a very bad copy remains available. 
This was a conference attended by women across 
the country discussing a wide range of issues. It’s 
a marvellous film because it captures the energy 
of the women’s movement. It shows the singing, 
the dancing and the sessions that were conducted 
on domestic violence, problems faced by single 
women and questions of sexuality.  
 
I did a workshop three years ago and during that I 
could actually map the way some young 
filmmakers had responded to the women’s 
movement and the films that they had made: one 
movie was on the anti-dowry movement, one 
more on sati, and so on. There were some good 
media pieces and some good feminist writers. For 
example, Kalpana Sharma goes back a long time, 
and Ammu Joseph: both were women journalists 
and products of the women’s movements. Even 
before that, in the early 1980s, Neerja Chowdhury 
had been there. All these people wrote on the 
entire range of issues we have been discussing. 
But what I find problematic is that we do not have 
systematic documentation of these pieces. I 
cannot think of any such collection. By now you 
could have done an edited volume of all the early 
pieces that these women wrote. It would be 
interesting to see what they wrote about, what 
they were responding to. 
 
You see, academic work is, by definition, 
documented. So there is a record. And some of 
the journalists and writers have also written 
books. For example, Ammu Joseph and Kalpana 
Sharma did a book, Whose news? The media and 
women’s issues, at one point; similarly, Sevanti 																																																													
15 A college in Delhi affiliated to the Delhi University. 
Ninan has done an interesting book on the Hindi 
heartland, Headlines from the heartland: 
reinventing the Hindi public sphere. But what 
would also be interesting now is to take the best 
pieces written by young women in newspapers 
around that time and create an archive. Today it 
would be a great resource. Since there is no such 
archive, there is memory loss in the public sphere. 
How will the younger generation know anything 
about any of the earlier feminist work? 
 
Today, the media do not look at it; and we do not 
have a story of how the media looked at it at 
earlier. What did they do and what did they fail to 
do? I think this is an important issue. 
RY: You have already given me some 
contemporary examples like the Kudankalam 
movement and there is also the Bhartiya Muslim 
Mahila Andolan (BMMA). What are some of the 
movements that have been able to sustain 
themselves over a long period of time? When 
some people say that there is no women’s 
movement I think they are also saying that 
movements are not able to sustain themselves. Do 
you think that is a problem? 
 
UC: I don’t think it is like that. See, we are not 
putting up a political party. So we have to 
reproduce ourselves individually and as collectives 
and through the range of issues that we take up. 
And a fairly wide range of issues is taken up. 
Whether it is the queer feminist movement, 
whether it’s Dalit feminists, or the strong feminist 
thrust of the disability movement; none of these 
would be possible if the women’s movement were 
actually dying. Like I said, the women’s movement 
has just gone in different directions, to different 
locations. Perhaps the level of visibility that we 
may have had in and around Delhi, or Mumbai, 
has gone down. If you look at who is engaging and 
with what issues they are engaging, you will see 
what is different today; but you will also see that it 
exists.  
 
For example, you can look at Sharifa Khanum’s 
work16 on women’s jamaats or at Deepa Dhanraj’s 																																																													
16 Sharifa Khanam is a Tamil Nadu based activist who 
has been fighting for Muslim women’s rights in legal 
and social arenas, particularly, through establishment 
of women’s jamaats and efforts to build a mosque for 
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films. Deepa Dhanraj has engaged with everything 
that she possible could; she has written on Indira 
Gandi’s erstwhile population policy and made a 
fantastic film on it, called, Something like a War. 
There was also Nupur Basu’s film on the anti-
arrack movement, Dry days in Dobbagunta... and 
Shabnam Virmani also made a movie on it. But 
these movies dealt with the movement without 
looking at its genesis in the TLM (Total Literacy 
Mission), the textbooks used in the programme or 
women’s discussions around the learning 
material. So some of these moments have been 
mapped, though not always adequately. 
 
Then again, the contemporary metropolitan 
women’s movement may or may not be 
interested in these movements. There is a 
liveliness to the women’s movement. There is no 
way we can say that it is not there. Today it is 
difficult to demarcate the urban… but it is the 
bigger cities and metropolises that fail to engage 
with ground realities. One cannot accuse, for 
example, the Lucknow women’s movement of not 
responding to the situation on the ground. Even 
Chennai has that tendency. But Delhi, Mumbai, 
etc. have changed. Now the Dalit women’s 
movement has made a huge impact and they have 
accused these metropolitan groups of not being 
bothered about events like Khairlanji17. 
																																																																																																
women in TN. A jamaat is an organisation; in this case, 
an ‘all-women organisation’ for Muslim women which 
‘emerged in response to allegations of chauvinism, 
corruption and abuse of power in the traditional, and 
all-male, Muslim jamaats.’ (Livemint, 15 Feb 2014). For 
further details, see, 
https://www.livemint.com/Leisure/1R2rO5eWbRzZdDb
qUsxWXI/Deepa-Dhanraj--Justice-league.html 
(Accessed on: 4 Sep 2018, 20: 49.) 
17 On 29 Sep 2006 four members of a Dalit family – 
Surekha Bhotmange, her daughter Priyanka and 
Surekha’s two sons, Roshan and Sudhir – were brutally 
assaulted and killed by Maratha-Kunbi villagers in 
Khairlanji village in Maharashtra. The two women were 
stripped, paraded naked and raped multiple times 
while the entire village watched and encouraged the 
perpetrators. Surekha’s husband, Bhaiyalal Bhotmange, 
who was away from home and thus survived the 
incident, fought for eleven years till his death in 2017 
for justice for his family. For details, see: 
https://navayana.org/blog/2017/01/22/the-entire-
And see, it is also related to what is – and isn’t – 
taught in college classrooms. If you do not teach 
about Sharifa Khanum’s work and if you do not 
show Deepa Dhanraj’s films, students will not 
really know what kind of theory the women’s 
movement generated or what interventions it 
made. One of the lesser known stories is that of 
the population question and the question of 
women’s health. These stories are less well-known 
than the first moment that consisted of the anti-
dowry struggle and so on. Even something like 
Ilina Sen’s book, ‘A Space within a Struggle…’, is 
now something from the past. It’s of an earlier 
time. She has now produced a second volume of 
that book which maps the range of issues with 
which the women’s movement has engaged. 
Because it is important for us to document what 
various movements are doing at this point in time. 
If we don’t document it, it won’t get taught in 
feminist and women’s studies courses, even in 
social sciences. For example, after 
neoliberalisation things have changed from what 
was happening earlier in the 1980s and 1990s – 
now it is about land struggles. Now there is an 
Emergency-like situation because of the 
aggression of predatory capital in Adivasi areas of 
Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh and parts of 
Madhya Pradesh. Then there are issues like the 
Sterlite protest in Thoothukudi18 which are about 
the wellbeing of communities being affected. 																																																																																																
village-was-involved-sir-entire-village-bhaiyalal-
bhotmange/ 
(Last accessed: 17 Oct 2018, 17:07.) 
https://www.huffingtonpost.in/2016/09/29/a-decade-
since-the-khairlanji-massacre-theres-been-no-let-up-
i_a_21483135/ (Last accessed: 17 Oct 2018, 17: 07). 
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/Readers-
Editor/Khairlanji-the-crime-and- 
punishment/article16149798.ece 
(Last accessed: 17 Oct 2018, 17: 08). 
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-
india/khairlanji-kopardi-rape-case-maratha-protests-
3053443/ (Last accessed: 17 Oct 2018, 17: 08). 
18 Thoothukudi in Tamil Nadu was the site of intense 
protests against the expansion of a copper smelter of 
Vedanta’s Sterlite Copper unit. Vedanta is a mining 
giant and its Sterlite unit has been accused by activists 
and communities in Thoothukudi of contaminating air 
and water resources and severely impacting the health 
of the community. In May 2018 thirteen people died as 
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But I don’t think questions around material reality 
have been dropped in the women’s movement, 
not even among groups who do single access 
lobbying. For example, the queer movement is 
very aware that there are other movements that 
raise economic or other questions. The material 
inequality is so palpable that for any movement to 
sustain itself, it has to engage with questions of 
material survival. 
 
RY: And there are always individuals who 
participate simultaneously in movements based on 
questions of identity as well as redistribution. For 
example, there are people who are part of both, 
the queer movement and the farmer’s movement 
in Karnataka. 
 
UC: And even though there have been lots of wars 
and passionate debates between Dalit feminists 
and others, the struggle to build solidarities and 
develop a vision which can simultaneously address 
different people’s oppressions is not something 
we have given up on. For example, there are 
people working on gender and caste who used to 
see the queer movement as a middle class, 
“western” issue. But eventually that changed. 
These people began to understand that you 
cannot write off anyone’s oppression. Some of 
these people even came for one of the sessions 
opposing Section 37719 and spoke there. Such 																																																																																																
a result of police firing on the protestors. For further 
details, see: 
http://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil-
nadu/2018/jun/23/none-held-accountable-for-
thoothukudi-firing-which-claimed-13-lives-
1832394.html (Last accessed: 17 Oct 2018, 17:16). 
https://scroll.in/article/880076/the-daily-fix-why-were-
police-shooting-to-kill-anti-sterlite-protestors-in-
thoothukudi (Last accessed: 17 Oct 2018, 17:16). 
https://scroll.in/article/874441/every-house-has-a-
sick-person-why-people-in-tuticorin-are-opposing-
vedantas-copper-smelter (Last accessed: 17 Oct 2018, 
17:17). 
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/entirely-
preventable/article23971795.ece (Last accessed: 17 
Oct 2018, 17:17). 
https://thewire.in/environment/in-thoothukudi-the-
choice-before-people-was-to-die-of-cancer-or-bullets 
(Last accessed: 17 Oct 2018, 17:18). 
19 Section 377 is part of the Indian Penal Code and 
criminalises homosexuality. In a landmark judgment in 
dialogue and open discussions helps us advance 
our own thinking and further our analyses; and if 
these can be sustained then we will ultimately be 
able to build some solidarities. 
 
RY: So you are saying that there is a divergence; 
feminist scholarship has gone in a slightly different 
direction with postmodernism and 
poststructuralism whereas people’s movements 
have gone in another direction? That the 
relationship between feminist academia and 
activism was much more solid in 1970s than it is 
now? 
 
UC: If you look at some individual scholars’ work 
you will see that they have managed to sustain 
their work. Take Bina Agarwal; she continues to 
work on economic questions and women’s rights 
to economic resources. Look at Kumkum Sangari; 
she started off with ‘Recasting Women’ and then 
did very brilliant work on sati20 and its revival in 
the 1980s21. She has looked at the 19th century as 
the formative phase [of raising the women’s 
question] and also looked at the whole range of 
issues which dominated our understanding at that 
time, for example, women’s education, or their 
right to speak for themselves. Kumkum has also 
done a book on new reproductive technologies 
like surrogacy. So there were dramatically 
different issues to be raised at each point of time 
but these were all fundamentally about women’s 
situation and status. 
 
Surrogacy is an important issue to analyse, 
particularly, the political economy of surrogacy. 
But it’s not seen as a political economy question. 
If at all there is anger and annoyance about it, it is 
from a nationalist perspective. Even the most 
right-wing nationalists are quite happy with new 
reproductive technologies because these bring in 
money. So, at the end of the day, money 
determines everything. I have sometimes said, ‘we 
are so nationalist about everything, how come we 
are not nationalist about our wombs?’ There are 
also class and caste dynamics to it. This is not the 
absolutely poor women, but the lower middle 																																																																																																
2018 the Supreme Court of India struck this section 
down. 
20 The practice of widow burning among some upper 
caste communities in north and western India. 
21 See Vaid and Sangari 1991. 
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class; and the woman’s womb is being used 
[commercially] so that her biological children can 
have a better life. It is a complicated issue. Like 
there is this relationship between dowry violence 
and sex selective abortion in India. Similarly, there 
is a biological angle to surrogacy which reduces 
women to their wombs. Women are reified as 
wombs. 
 
In addition to these issues, there has also been a 
lot of work on caste in the later phase of the 
women’s movement. 
 
RY: When you say later, when do you mean? 
 
UC: 1990s to 2000s… 1994 is when I wrote 
Reconceptualising gender: Phule, Brahmanism and 
Brahmanical patriarchy22; it came on the heels of 
the anti-Mandal movement23 and then I wrote 
Gendering Caste in 2002 or 2003. Sharmila Rege 
also did important work on caste which took us in 
a different direction. We were looking at the 
political economy, culture, and caste-based 
exploitation and trying to theorise intersections of 
class and caste. A lot of this work was happening 
for the first time then. 
RY: What is the state of engagement of 
contemporary feminist academics with 
movements like the one in Kudankulam or 
organisations like the BMMA? 
 
UC: Well, yes, there is a divide… Our generation 
was one that had one foot in academia and one in 
feminist activism, but that is not necessarily so 
now for many feminist academics. 
 
RY: The intimacy is not there..? 
 
UC: It’s there and it’s not there. It’s there in places 
like Pune but less so in places like Delhi, Mumbai 																																																													
22 See Chakravarti 1996. 
23 The anti-Mandal protest was a movement led largely 
by upper caste students to oppose the 
recommendations and implementation of the Mandal 
Commission report (also called the Social and 
Educationally Backward Classes Commission). The 
Commission recommended expanding caste-based 
reservation in public sector jobs to castes identified as 
Other Backward Classes, in addition to that for the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in India. For 
further details on the commission and the anti-Mandal 
protests, see Chakravarti 2009, Deshpande 2014, 
Thorat and Newman 2012. 
or Kolkata. Fine scholarship coming out but not 
necessarily engaged with the big movements. 
 
RY: What do we lose politically and theoretically 
when that happens? 
 
UC: It depends on how you work at it, right? For 
example, Kavita Panjabi has done a beautiful book 
on the Tebhaga movement. She brought in the 
question of women’s role in Left movements. She 
has done a very fine analysis. Now, I think, it’s not 
going to get read by those who were part of the 
movement because those questions have gone. 
Now there are different questions on the ground. 
But a history of things is being lost [if we do not 
write about such movements]. We have dropped 
certain phases completely; certain histories of 
women’s participation in broader political 
struggles. For example, there is Kotteshwaramma 
who was in the Telangana movement24; she went 
to jail and saw the left movement collapsing and 
she is utterly feminist! She refused to be 
obliterated by her own personal circumstances… 
 
Now we are the intermediate generation; the 
earlier generation was represented by Neera 
Desai, Veena Majumdar, etc. and the 
contemporary generation is the Pinjra Tod, MeToo 
and so on. It is up to us to record that history but 
we are not looking at the legacy of the activism 
which started in 1946, went into the Telangana 
movement, or into the communist movement. We 
have come to the Naxalite movement now. But 
the current generation of students, young women 
or activists also often do not know these histories. 
Till early 2000’s there was not such a disconnect. 
But since the mid-1990’s, when the neoliberal 
phase began, there is a new generation of 
students and activists who do not know any of the 
post-independence history and therefore, do not 
know the roots of our political engagement, or the 
relationship between academic and activist work. 
For example, that relationship evolved into the 
Indian Association of Women’s Studies (IAWS) 
conferences. There was no question of activists 
not going to IAWS conferences! Questions 
regarding caste and gender are there in our 
[university] syllabus. But these discussions are not 																																																													
24 The book, We were Making History, was written on 
the movement by the collective, Stree Shakti 
Sangathana. 
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part of students’ experience of activism. But now, 
in the second decade of this century a new 
generation of students and activists is coming 
back to some of these experiences. 
 
And I think, in some places, activists are still going 
to IAWS conferences. It is difficult to generalise; 
for example, in Mumbai sections of activists are 
still going. That way the Tata Institute of Social 
Sciences is interesting. The ‘activist slash 
academic’ is still there. Meena Gopal and Nandini 
Manjrekar are people who are engaged with 
writing but they are also in the movement. They 
are not outside of the movement. Participation 
depends on how much you are able to read, write 
and go to smaller politically active groups and talk 
to them. That has not gone away completely. 
 
RY: Is it also happening because it is now harder to 
do these things on college and university 
campuses? Is there more policing by right-wing 
groups or institutes themselves? 
 
UC: No. No. No. It’s not because of the policing. 
It’s the academics who have put themselves into a 
corner. In the women’s or anti-caste movements, 
people don’t have a problem speaking. Actually I 
would like to see how the RSS25 would respond to 
Sundari’s perspective on Kudankulam. 
 
RY: And the ABVP26? 
 
UC: But the ABVP won’t be able to oppose 
movements like Kudankulam that easily.  They can 
do it for Kashmir. But not for Kudankulam. 
Sundari’s formulation is fantastic. When 
Manmohan Singh27 came and said, there is no 
danger to it and it is perfectly safe, Sundari asked, 
“if it’s so safe why don’t they put it in front of the 
Parliament?” I don’t think the ABVP can label her 
anti-national for that. But interestingly, the 
																																																													
25 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, a powerful right-
wing, Hindu nationalist organisation in India. 
26 Akhil Bhartiya Vidyarthi Parishad; it is the student 
wing of the Bhartiya Janata Party. Since the BJP came 
to power in Delhi in 2014 the ABVP has been involved 
in several incidents of aggression against students 
challenging gender, religion and caste-based 
marginalisation and oppression. 
27 Dr. Manmohan Singh is a former Prime Minister of 
India. 
Congress28 was able to do that. They slapped 
some three hundred cases of sedition against her. 
ABVP hooliganism is definitely there but they are 
not going to bother about the [impact of the] 
women’s movement. What’s the women’s 
movement [they will ask]? They will say, “we can 
marshal lakhs of women to speak on our behalf, 
about Hindutva.” At the moment, they are more 
bothered about history, nationalism, nationality, 
border issues and so on. I think the women’s 
movement has not become big enough to be a 
danger to them. Actually that tells us that issues 
like the right to marriage or the right to choice 
need to be articulated more sharply and 
consistently. It does happen sometimes; for 
example, Indira Jaisingh provided a perfect 
formulation of what happened with 
Hadiya/Akhila.29 
 
RY: You mentioned in your talk at Warwick (June 
2017) that many scholars are more concerned 
with colonial history and critiques of the colonial 
nation-state than with that of the post-colonial 
state. Were you referring to the subaltern studies 
group? 
 
UC: Yes, I was. Very much so. After that talk a 
South African woman came and said to me that 
the colonial state and history were still very 
relevant to them. I agree with her because in 
South Africa there has been no real transfer of 
power and the Whites continue to have a tight 
grip on the economy and though it’s not done 
formally, apartheid continues to be upheld. But it 
is different in India. We threw the colonisers out 																																																													
28 Indian National Congress. The INC-led coalition, 
United Progressive Alliance, was in power with 
Manmohan Singh at the helm from 2004 to 2014 at the 
centre. 
29 Hadiya is a young woman from Kerala who converted 
to Islam in her twenties. At the age of twenty-six years, 
she also chose a Muslim man as her husband. However, 
her family and the Kerala High Court questioned her 
right to choose her husband without her family’s 
intervention and the court annulled her marriage. In 
March 2018 the Supreme Court of India finally reversed 
this judgment and upheld Hadiya’s freedom to choose 
her partner. For details, see: 
https://www.thenewsminute.com/article/big-win-
freedom-choice-sc-upholds-hadiya-and-shafin-s-
marriage-77632 (Last accessed: 4 Sep 2018, 23: 35). 
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and then we invited them back with neoliberal 
policies. So, at the end of the day, why do we 
continue to just focus on colonial rule? 
 
Someone at SOAS30 told me that they need to still 
hold on to that critique because the White kids in 
class do not understand it. But my life and work is 
in India and, beyond a point, I am not going to 
bother about the problems that the “First World” 
university system confronts. For me, it is more 
important to ensure that my society and state are 
not responsible for creating repressive 
mechanisms. As a person who lives in today’s 
India I must engage with the question of 
[upholding our] Constitutional values. Otherwise, I 
am no use as an historian or a political scientist. 
So my hit was at the Post-colonial studies group 
and I am happy with the theorists who are not 
writing about that. It makes me very angry that I 
have to read Agamben in order to understand the 
repressive Indian state. It is the job of Indian 
political scientists to develop critiques of the post-
independence Indian state. 
 
RY: Rajni Kothari was doing this kind of work, 
wasn’t he? 
 
UC: But he stopped with criticising the Congress. 
My question is, how have we engaged with the 
last 20-25 years’ history of the repressive Indian 
state?  Why are we not writing about that? I was 
glad that finally Partha Chatterjee spoke on the 
Indian state (on the Kashmir issue). Though it 
meant that he got into a controversy.31 
 
RY: One of the damages the British imperative for 
administration did was that it froze social 
categories; does this history have implications for 
our understanding of gender and caste today? 
 
UC: Yes. And no. This leads to a position where we 
start saying that the British created the caste 
system… 
 
RY: But they didn’t. 
 
UC: I know. But it’s easy to slide off into that 
argument and say that. We have a long 
precolonial history. Why does my history have to 																																																													
30 School of Oriental and Asian Studies, University of 
London. 
31 http//pulsemedia.org/2015/09/10 (Last accessed on 
17.10.2018; 17: 21). 
start with colonial India? 
 
RY: Or end with it? 
 
UC: As an historian I understand that caste was 
being discussed in 6th century BC. So it is difficult 
to accept arguments saying that the British came 
and created caste. The fact is that, up until a 
certain point, allowing caste dynamics to operate 
discretely was actually quite practical and sensible 
as far as the British were concerned. They did not 
care what the actual practices were like, whether 
a community ate beef or not. The middle class, 
upper caste intelligentsia began to care when they 
homogenised themselves and they wanted the 
upper caste Brahmanical attitudes to go down all 
the way. It is important to understand history as a 
dynamic system but also that institutions like 
those of caste have always been oppressive. This 
is something we must acknowledge. Caste-based 
oppression may not always have had the same 
form and, of course, jati was a fluid system. 
 
For example, if you look at the Rakhma Bai case32, 
one of her arguments was that, ‘we have the 
concept of divorce in our community, so how can 
this man demand restitution of conjugal rights and 
expect that he is going to live with me or force 
himself upon me?’. The British were embarrassed 
about it, but so were the Brahmanical Hindus; the 
latter were furious about it. They did not care that 
that man was a sutar; Rakhma bai was a sutar 
which was an OBC33 caste. But, in the new efforts 
to homogenise Indians, people like Tilak were 
getting very excited. Their core paradigms were 																																																													
32 Rakhma Bai was married to a nineteen-year old man 
when she was eleven-years old. When she entered 
puberty at age 12 she refused to go and live with her 
husband and her family supported her decision. 
Eventually there was a long drawn-out court case and 
public debates resulting in the Age of Consent Act, 
1891. While the courts upheld Rakhma Bai’s marriage, 
Queen Victoria dissolved the marriage and Rakhma Bai 
continued her education. For a detailed and nuanced 
discussion, see, Tanika Sarkar’s Hindu Wife, Hindu 
Nation (2000). For a summary Rakhma Bai’s story, see 
this news report: 
https://www.ndtv.com/education/google-doodle-on-
rukhmabai-raut-how-her-quest-for-education-led-to-
age-of-consent-act-1891-1778576 (Last accessed: 4 Sep 
2018, 23: 54). 
33 Other Backward Classes. 
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women like Savitri who were idealised for even 
following a dying or dead husband so how could 
Rakhma Bai refuse to live with her husband? 
 
There were limitations to the British willingness to 
intervene in social systems like caste.  Yes, of 
course, there were interventions and those of us 
working on gender and caste have willingly drawn 
upon that because it gave us some power. At the 
end of the day, the caste system has survived and 
it has remained a very oppressive system. So a 
Maang (a former untouchable community) 
woman like Mukta Bai will talk about the Peshwai 
and point out that it was a horribly oppressive 
system. I cannot accept arguments like those 
made by Ashis Nandy which say that the British 
created caste. 
 
RY: Then instead of being seen as the only 
determinant of our present, colonial rule has to be 
understood and engaged with as a moment in 
history and as exemplifying the way relations and 
institutions shift form.  
 
UC: And to what extent do they fail to change. 
There is a famous essay on caste written by N 
Waghle in the 1920s. It looks at an instance of the 
British refusing to intervene in a caste dispute. 
This was a very important moment because at this 
point the legitimacy and power of the Hindu state 
had been withdrawn. But it is not as if the British 
were very egalitarian. They often refused to use 
their power to intervene in the internal 
conversations and confrontations of the caste 
system. They reckoned that ultimately the group 
of people demanding rights for themselves had to 
sort it out, whereas, earlier, the Peshwai might 
have stuck its nose in the business because as the 
ruling group, they would have been interested in 
upholding Brahmanical power. 
 
RY: Sudipta Kaviraj has argued that the state-
society relationship was different before colonial 
rule and before Indian became a nation-state. 
What did that mean for caste relations? 
 
UC: The state was always interested in [upholding] 
the caste system. For example, there is a Japanese 
scholar, Fukazawa, who has done interesting work 
on the Peshwai34. In one of my articles I have also 
discussed the fact the highest rates of suicides 																																																													
34 See Fukazawa 1991. 
was found among Brahmin women35. After all, the 
burden of policing lay maximally with the upper 
caste woman. She had no exit except committing 
suicide. Equally, they were ensuring that the caste 
relations were maintained. 
 
The state-society relationship varied depending on 
whether the group in power was Brahmans, OBCs 
or anyone else. Fact of the matter remains that 
the state has always been interested in the caste 
system. 
 
RY: Was it not because caste also determined who 
got to rule? 
 
UC: Or it could bestow legitimacy. One could 
appropriate power and then call themselves a 
Kshatriya. That is what Shivaji did. 
 
RY: Let me go back to your argument that political 
and social scientists should systematically develop 
a critique of the way the nation state has operated 
in post-liberalisation India. Do you think that 
because of globalisation the nation-state is being 
seen as less important? This is an argument 
offered by economists, development studies 
scholars and educationists internationally. Might 
that be a reason there is so little scholarship 
critiquing the nation state in neoliberal India? 
 
UC: That must be an important idea in the West. I 
do not think it is there in that form in India. In 
India, there is a powerful understanding of what is 
happening on the ground as a result of the new 
economic moves made globally and, in particular, 
locally. But the questions is: why is there so little 
theorisation of new structures of power, 
especially, around the question of nationalism? 
Yes, colonialism created multiple problems but we 
now need to focus on developing systematic 
understanding of contemporary state structures 
and what these are doing to various marginalised 
groups. We need to theorise why anyone 
interrogating the contemporary Indian nation-
state faces brutal repression. 
 
The current status of the relationship between 
nationalism and neoliberal economics is striking. It 
seems that our scholars view nationalism as a 
phenomenon that we dealt with in the colonial 
period and now it is no longer relevant. The first 																																																													
35 See Chakravarti 2001. 
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thing that many post-independence states did was 
to respond to the economic needs of historically 
marginalised sections. One may lambast Nehru as 
much as they like but he attempted through 
policies such as the Five Year Plans and land 
reforms to remedy structural inequalities. At the 
end of the day, it was a failed venture because it 
did not lead to massive structural changes. And 
before that could be achieved we have entered 
the neoliberal phase. Thus immediately after 
independence our nationalism ensured that we 
focused on our people and on industrial 
development through protective mechanisms. The 
state engaged in massive industrialisation under 
Nehru and prevented foreign capital from coming 
in. Part of this nationalist consciousness was also 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). 
 
All of that has been chucked out now and with 
neoliberalism we are actually inviting foreign 
investments and control and opening up our 
borders economically. The push for such moves 
has come from international sources and our own 
debt crises. It has been compounded by the desire 
of certain sections of our society to be upwardly 
mobile. What we now have is extremely predatory 
capitalism and what is happening, for instance, in 
the entire Adivasi belt in central India is 
exploitation of our natural resources. These were 
actually among the things that were not in the 
hands of the middle class. These resources were 
either under state control or under that of the 
people. 
 
RY: It is the state that is inviting…. 
 
UC: Yes, it is the state that is inviting this 
multinational and corporate capita into India. And 
the middle classes benefit through employment 
with these companies: their purchasing power 
improves and they are able to access expensive 
lifestyles. But Adivasi people were actually 
working and living on those lands. Their entire 
means of subsistence are being damaged under 
this onslaught by international capital. Where is 
your economic nationalism if today you are 
actually quite happy to have yourself exploited in 
the most aggressive ways?  I will come back to this 
in a minute…  The point is that the Indian state 
was never in welfare; it never got down to really 
solving the problems of structural inequality and 
has now completely retreated because that is how 
it is supposed to be under neoliberalism. We are 
retreating from the people. We have nothing, 
now, for them. Programmes like the NREGS 
(National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme) 
are attacked viciously by neoliberal economists 
and media analysts. Tavleen Singh, for example, 
gets hysterical about the NREGS. 
 
Yet, predatory capitalism cannot enter a country 
without the state actually being strong. The state 
is not weak. It is only retreating from certain 
obligations. The state is strong and it is coercive. 
There is no disbanding of the army and the police. 
The hard state structure has stayed. This hard 
structure is absolutely necessary because 
predatory capitalism cannot enter areas like 
central India – because there is so much 
resistance – without this backing of the Indian 
state. The Indian state is absolutely necessary for 
multinational companies to come in. So what is 
happening? The Dalits have always been landless. 
But the Adivasis did have land. That is the 
difference between the Dalits and the Adivasis – 
the Dalits never had resources. The Adivasis had 
resources which they were sitting on. They are 
now being pushed out and forced to become 
displaced, migrant labour. But they are attached 
to their way of life and so they resist. And the 
greater the resistance the more vicious the attack 
from the state. 
So how do you understand nationalism in such a 
situation? For the new right-wing nationalists, it is 
perfectly alright to have massive exploitation of 
some sections of people. All they want to do is to 
maintain their “culture” and their right to 
proclaim, ‘we were the best in the world at one 
point in the past’, that ‘we are the indigenous 
people, the Aryans never came from outside; the 
Aryans were always here.’ They make these kinds 
of rhetorical claims but do not care that there is 
exploitation. Thus there is complete investment in 
the new economy and in the new, hard, 
militarised state structures. I think the new 
alliance is between USA, Israel and India… 
 
RY: Which is very scary. 
 
UC: It is totally scary. But that is the package that 
we are now invested in. We want to be [a] hard 
[state]. We want to have a strong military. 
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Everything that is happening in the country now 
stems from that desire. 
 
RY: So that is the kind of loss of historical 
consciousness to which you referred in the talk at 
Warwick? 
 
UC: It is a handling of historical consciousness that 
disallows recent history. Why is Nehru targeted so 
much these days by the ruling dispensation? Not 
only because the Indian National Congress is part 
of the Nehruvian dynasty. Fair enough. I have no 
problems with criticisms of dynastic rule in 
democracies. But the current government are also 
attacking the political and economic efforts made 
under Nehru to address historical inequalities. 
Those efforts may have failed; I don’t think the 
Nehruvian state went far enough anyway. But I 
don’t want the state to go right-wing either. 
 
RY: Instead it would seem that Nehruvian 
discourses needed to be sharpened, further 
developed. 
 
UC: Yes, and you have to solve the problems of 
the people on the ground. There is still lack of 
education; if you look at what’s happening in 
many of the villages in Bihar – where Anand, my 
partner, has been doing some research – the lives 
of the underclass remain completely bogged down 
in abject poverty. They are unable to even 
physically reproduce themselves because there is 
no food and, no healthcare. Healthcare-related 
expenses are a big drain on families. Whatever 
resources a family may have, go into that. 
 
I think, perhaps, this generation of feminists – I 
wouldn’t say all kinds of feminists – but many of 
the urban feminists really do not have any 
understanding of what’s going on. That way the 
Dalit feminists or movements away from the 
centre of the nation-state have a better 
understanding. For example, in Chennai, they 
know about the Kudankulam movement. They 
know the basis of the Dalit feminist movement. 
They cannot escape it. 
 
But the Delhi feminist [academics] can. And do. 
Where is their engagement with the kinds of 
material conditions I have mentioned? In that 
sense, one could say that historical consciousness 
has either been muted or it is just simply so 
narrowed down; it has been defined in such a way 
by one set of subjective experiences that it fails to 
grapple with other kinds of realities. Nobody will 
say that these are not important issues but 
systematic engagement and in-depth 
understanding are missing. An interesting thing 
that has happened is that today even sections of 
queer feminist movement, who have had their 
social roots in the urban middle class, have had to 
engage with Dalit movements. 
 
But there is still the question of solidarities. Some 
time back, there was this movement called, ‘Chalo 
Nagpur’; lots of different groups ended up in 
Nagpur and there were several heated debates 
and conflicts. For example, there was, to some 
extent, an argument between Dalit feminists and 
other strands of feminism, especially sex workers; 
it was very sharp, extremely sharp. Some of the 
Dalit feminists were really angry with some sex 
workers’ perspectives that there was choice or 
agency involved in their engagement in sex work. 
Some of the Dalit feminists were so angry that 
they did not want to allow the sex workers to 
speak. But very interestingly, two other Dalit 
feminists intervened in this argument and ensured 
that the sex workers could make a statement. 
 
After identity-based feminism questioned the idea 
of ‘sisterhood’ assumed by feminists in the 1970s 
and 1980s and put the concerns of different 
groups on the table there has been tension 
between various groups of feminists. But now 
there are also attempts to create solidarities and 
find means by which we can all do politics 
together. The question of what kind of politics, 
and in which direction it should move, still needs 
to be sorted out. But there is a desire to work 
together so that we do not lose our collective 
strength completely because there are important 
challenges facing all of us. For example, everyone 
is on the same page as far as Hindutva nationalism 
is concerned, or the policies of the state in post-
liberalisation India. If today Dalits still need to 
struggle against high odds, it is precisely the 
failure of the state. 
 
So, yes, there has been tension. But, then, some 
groups of feminists have acknowledged the flaws 
and blind spots of the earlier phase of the 
women’s movement which pretended that there 
was one homogenous group of women, and that 
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has allowed us to have dialogue across differences 
of caste and class. Class was vaguely understood 
even earlier, but caste was not. Caste was the 
thing that made them feel guilty. Class did not 
make them feel guilty. 
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